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This paper considers the following question: what is the relationship
between supervenience and reduction? I investigate this formally, first by
introducing a recent argument by Christian List to the effect that one can
have supervenience without reduction; then by considering how the notion
of Nagelian reduction can be related to the formal apparatus of definability
and translation theory; then by showing how, in the context of propositional
theories, topological constraints on supervenience serve to enforce reducibil-
ity; and finally, how constraints derived from the theory of ultraproducts can
enforce reducibility in the context of first-order theories.
1 List on supervenience and reduction
I’ll start by giving a brief recapitulation of the apparatus used by List (2018) to analyse
supervenience. For List, a system of ontological levels is a concrete posetal category
wherein each function is surjective. That is, it consists of a class of sets L, equipped
with surjective functions between them, such that (i) the class of all such functions is
closed under composition, and for each set we include the identity function on that set
(hence making this a concrete category); and (ii) for any sets A and B, there is a unique
function σ mapping A to B (hence making the category posetal).
In order to relate this to issues of reduction, List introduces certain linguistic notions.
Formally, he defines a language L to be a set (of “sentences”), equipped with a unary
“negation” operator and a “consistency” property. Given a language L, List defines the
ontology ΩL of L to be the set of all maximal consistent subsets of L (where a consistent
set A is maximal iff there is no consistent B such that A ⊂ B). Each element of this
ontology he calls a world for L. For any φ ∈ L, φ is true at the world ω ∈ ΩL iff φ ∈ ω;
otherwise, it is false at ω. The propositional content [[φ]] of φ ∈ L is the set of worlds at
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which φ is true: that is, [[φ]] := {ω ∈ ΩL : φ ∈ ω}. Then, a system of descriptive levels is a
system of ontological levels where each level is the ontology ΩL of some language L.
The notion of reduction is defined as follows. Given some system of descriptive levels,
suppose that σ : ΩL → ΩL′ is a superveniencemapping. List says that a sentence φ′ ∈ L′
reduces to φ ∈ L if [[φ]] = σ−1([[φ′]]): that is, if φ is true at a world ω iff φ′ is true at σ(ω).
And we say that the language L′ reduces to L if every φ′ ∈ L reduces to some φ ∈ L:
that is, if every higher-level sentences is reducible to some lower-level sentence.
Certainly, setting up this kind of association between the apparatus of possibleworlds
and languages is going to be necessary if we are going to talk about the relationship
between supervenience (a map, on this treatment, between ontologies) and reduction
(a relationship between languages). But it is not clear to me that this is quite the right
way to set things up.
First, it seems a mistake to use maximal consistent sets of sentences to represent
the ontology associated to a language. This is not because I have a problem with
identifying worlds with sets of sentences—we’re just doing mathematical modelling,
after all, so “identification” isn’t really doing anything more than asserting a one-to-
one correspondence. Rather, the problem is that there are intuitive reasons to think
that, in general, there are more worlds (of a given language’s ontology) than there are
maximal consistent sets of sentences of that language. Specifically, consider the class
of models of a first-order language L. It seems plausible to suppose that there could
be a world just like each model—one with the same number of individuals as there
are elements in the model’s domain, and with properties and relations distributed over
those individuals just as the extensions of the predicates are distributed over the model.
This suggests that we can take such models to represent worlds, with non-isomorphic
models representing distinct worlds.1 But in first-order logic, there are non-isomorphic
models which are elementarily equivalent, i.e., which satisfy all the same sentences.
So a maximal consistent set of sentences will, in general, be satisfied by several non-
isomorphic models, and so by several distinct worlds.
For this reason, I suggest that a friendly amendment to List’s proposal is that we take
the ontology associated with a language to be the class of models for that language,
rather than the set of maximal consistent sets of sentences of that language. This will
require us to say a little more about the nature of the language: for the purposes of
this essay, I will assume that we are working with finitary first-order languages, each
1Whether isomorphic models represent distinct worlds or not is more controversial (it is closely related
to the question of whether or not to believe in haecceities, i.e., primitive trans-world identities for
individuals).
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with a particular nonlogical vocabulary. Note that we are including the possibility that
the language is a propositional language (regarding propositional constants as nullary
predicates).
That said, it does seem that we don’t want to represent the ontology associated
to a given level by all models of the associated language. After all, if the language
contains predicates R for “red all over” and G for “green all over”, then there will be
a model containing objects satisfying both R and G. That is, the worlds represented
by the class of all models is intuitively the class of logically possible worlds, but that
is typically not the species of possibility that we are interested in for the purposes of
supervenience. Standardly, we want to consider supervenience relative to metaphysical
possibility, or relative to something more restrictive still (e.g. physical possibility). In
List’s approach, one could code this up into the consistency property, so that onlyworlds
corresponding tometaphysically or physically consistent sets of sentences are permitted
(where “physical inconsistency” would mean, roughly, consistency with the physical
laws).
In the friendly amendment I’m suggesting here, a more natural way to do things
would be to confine attention to the models of some theory, where that theory consists
of all and only the sentences expressing things which are necessary—necessary, that is,
relative to the standard of possibility we seek to capture. Thus, if we are thinking about
metaphysical possibility, then we take the theory to consist of all the metaphysically
necessaryL-sentences (e.g. ∀x(¬Rx∧Gx)); if we are thinking about physical possibility,
then we take the theory to consist of all the L-sentences expressing physical laws;
and so on and so forth. So every descriptive level is associated with a given theory,
and the supervenience maps between levels are maps between the sets of models of
the associated theories. We follow List in imposing the requirements that the sets of
models, equipped with the supervenience maps, constitute a posetal category. Rather
than requiring that these maps be surjective, however, it will be more helpful to reflect
further on the relationship between models and the possible worlds they represent.
The relevant observation is that consistency with the laws at its own level is only a
necessary condition for a model to represent a possible world, not a sufficient one: it
is natural to think that the sense of possibility relevant for supervenience is something
stronger. Just because a certain distribution of thermodynamical properties is possible
according to the laws of thermodynamics, for instance, does not mean that that dis-
tribution is possible tout court; in particular, such a distribution may not be one that
could actually be generated by any statistical-mechanically possible configuration of the
microstructure. Thus, in the event that two descriptive levels, associated with theories
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T1 and T2, have a supervenience map σ : Mod(T2)→ Mod(T1), then we should take the
ontology of T1 (i.e., the possible worlds at the T1-level) to include only those models of
T1 that lie in the image of the supervenience mapping: i.e., that Ω1 ⊆ σ[Mod(T2)]. And
of course, for any other descriptive level upon which the T1-level supervenes, the same
requirement will hold.
By taking these to be the only such requirements, we may define the ontology as-
sociated with a given level as follows: suppose that the T -level supervenes upon all
and only the Ti-levels, for i in some index set I , with the supervenience mappings σi :
Mod(Ti)→ Mod(T ). Then we let the ontology for the T -level be Ω :=
⋂
i∈I σi[Mod(Ti)].
It follows that if the T1-level supervenes upon the T2-level, then the supervenience map
is surjective on ontologies: that is, for everyM1 ∈ Ω1, there is someM2 ∈ Ω2 such that
σ(M2) =M1.
Finally, if the T1-level supervenes upon the T2-level, with supervenience map σ, I’ll
say that an L1-sentence φ1 List-reduces to the L2-sentence φ2 if [[φ2]] = σ−1([[φ1]]): that
is, if for every M ∈ Ω2, M |= φ2 iff σ(M) |= φ1. And T1 List-reduces to T2 if every
L1-sentence φ1 is reducible to some L2-sentence φ2.
List observes that, within his framework, supervenience does not entail reducibility.
In the version of that framework developed here, this is encoded by the following result.
Theorem 1. Not every system of descriptive levels is such that if the T1-level supervenes on the
T2-level, then T1 is List-reducible to T2.
List appeals to general combinatorial considerations for a proof. However, it will be
illuminating (and helpful for the sequel) to construct an explicit counterexample to the
hypothesis that supervenience entails reduction.2
Proof. Let L1 be the propositional language whose only sentence-letter is F , and let L2
be the propositional language with sentence-letters {P0, P1, . . . }. Let T1 = T2 = ∅.
Mod(T1) only contains two worlds: setMF (F ) = >, andM¬F (F ) = ⊥. LetM be the
T2-model such thatM(Pi) = > for every Pi. Define σ : Mod(T2)→ Mod(T1) as follows:
for any A ∈ Mod(T2),
σ(A) :=
MF if A =MM¬F otherwise (1)
Since the T2-level is the lowest, Ω2 = Mod(T2); hence Ω1 = σ[Ω2] = Mod(T1).
2This example is inspired by a construction in Halvorson (2012).
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Now observe that σ−1([[F ]]) = {M}. But {M} is not a definable subset of Ω2: that
is, there is no sentence φ ∈ L2 such that [[φ]] = {M}.3 So the sentence F ∈ L1 is not
reducible to any sentence in L2; thus, T1 is not reducible to T2.
Now, one natural (and I think appropriate) response to this argument is that it is
unsurprising. After all, we have imposed almost no constraints on the supervenience
map. A superveniencemap between two ontological levels is just amap from theworlds
of one level to the worlds of the other, with no constraints on how that map must relate
to the structure present in those worlds. So for the rest of this essay, I would like to
consider some ways in which we could impose such constraints on the maps, and what
consequences those constraints have for reducibility.
2 Definition and reduction
Before going further, Iwant to pause tomake contactwith somemore fully-fledgedways
of thinking about reduction. This will involve some of the apparatus of definability
theory from logic.4 An explicit definition of R in terms of Σ is a formula of the form
δR = ∀x1 . . . ∀xn(Rx1 . . . xn ↔ τR(x1, . . . , xn)) (2)
where τR is a Σ-formula. Given a Σ-theory T and Σ+-theory T+, where Σ ⊂ Σ+, T+ is
a definitional extension of T if T+ is logically equivalent to the theory
T ∪ {δR : R ∈ Σ+ \ Σ} (3)
where for each R, δR is an explicit definition of R in terms of Σ. More generally, any
Σ+-theory T+ explicitly defines a symbolR ∈ Σ+ \Σ in terms of Σ if it entails an explicit
definition δR of R in terms of Σ: that is, if T+  δR for some δR of the form (2).
Now, this may be compared to Nagel (1979)’s definition of reduction:
[. . . ] a reduction is effected when the experimental laws of the secondary
science (and if it has an adequate theory, its theory as well) are shown to
be the logical consequences of the theoretical assumptions (inclusive of the
3Proof: suppose for reductio that [[φ]] = {M}. Since φ is a finite sentence, not every sentence-letter can
occur in it. So suppose Pi does not occur in φ. Then since M |= φ, it must be the case that M′ |= φ,
whereM′ is just likeM save thatM′(Pi) = ⊥ (as the truth-value of a sentence in propositional logic
is dependent only on the truth-values of the sentence-letters occurring in it). But then M′ ∈ [[φ]],
althoughM′ 6= M, so we have a contradiction. QED.
4See (Hodges, 1997, §2.6) for further details.
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coordinating definitions) of the primary science. [. . . ] when the laws of the
secondary science do contain some term ‘A’ that is absent from the theo-
retical assumptions of the primary science, there are two necessary formal
conditions for the reduction of the former to the latter: (1) Assumptions of
some kind must be introduced which postulate suitable relations between
whatever is signified by ‘A’ and traits represented by terms already present
in the primary science. [. . . ] (2) With the help of these additional assump-
tions, all the laws of the secondary science, including those containing the
term ‘A’, must be logically derivable from the theoretical premises and their
associated coordinating definitions in the primary discipline.5
As it is oftenput: a theoryT1 is reducible to a theoryT2 just in caseT1 can bederived from
T2 together with so-called bridge laws. Now, as has been widely discussed,6 if we place
no restrictions on the content of the bridge laws then reduction becomes trivialised:
any theory T1 may be reduced to any other theory T2, by taking as the bridge laws
either T1 itself, or any inconsistent set of statements. To avoid this problem, we put two
restrictions on the bridge laws. The first is that the bridge laws do indeed serve to bridge
the gap between T1 and T2: formally, we require that T2 plus the bridge laws explicitly
defines every symbol R ∈ Σ1 \ Σ2 (where Σ1 and Σ2 are, respectively, the vocabularies
of T1 and T2). The second is that the bridge laws not sneak in “extra content” beyond
this bridging function: formally, we require that T2 plus the bridge laws be a conservative
extension of T2. (Recall that a Σ+-theory T+ is a conservative extension of a given Σ-
theory T , where Σ ⊆ Σ+, if T+ has no new Σ-consequences relative to T : that is, if for
every Σ-sentence φ, T+  φ entails that T  φ.)
But if these two conditions are satisfied, then T2 together with the bridge laws is
a definitional extension of T2.7 Thus, to within logical equivalence, we may suppose
that the bridge laws are explicit definitions of the novel terms (i.e., of the symbols
in Σ1 \ Σ2).8 Note that this agrees with Schaffner’s requirement that bridge laws be
“reduction functions” (statements that a certain term of T1 and a certain term of T2 are
coextensional)—provided, that is, that we take the reduction functions to relate a simple
term of T1 to a (possibly) complex term of T2.9 Thus, we are led to posit the following
5(Nagel, 1979, pp. 352–354)
6See, for instance, Dizadji-Bahmani et al. (2010) and references therein.
7(Hodges, 1997, pp. 53–54).
8Note that all we are supposing here is that every bridge law has the syntactic form of a definition (i.e.,
of a biconditional of the form (2)). This is neutral on the question of what the content of the bridge laws
is: for instance, whether that of a set of definitions, a set of conventional stipulations, or a set of factual
assertions (Nagel, 1979, pp. 354–355).
9This identification of Nagelian reduction with definitional extension is also made by Butterfield (2011a).
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relation: a theory T1 Nagel-reduces to T2 if there is some definitional extension T+2 of T2
such that T+2  T1.10
We now want to think about how all this relates to the apparatus of supervenience
mappings developed in the previous section. For these purposes, it is helpful to work
with the notions of interpretation and translation rather than definition—though as we
shall see, these are closely intertwined.11 So, define an interpretation from one language
L1 to another language L2 to be a map τ : Form(L1)→ Form(L2) which commutes with
the logical constants (where Form(L) is the set of formulae of L). And given theories
T1 and T2, in languages L1 and L2 respectively, define a translation from T1 to T2 to be
an interpretation τ : L1 → L2 such that for any φ ∈ Form(L1), if T1  φ, then T2  τ(φ).
This lets us give a more compact characterisation of Nagel-reduction, as follows.
Theorem 2. T1 Nagel-reduces to T2 iff there is a translation τ : T1 → T2 which restricts to the
identity on Σ1 ∩ Σ2.
Proof. Before starting the proof proper, we state a quick lemma. Suppose that τ :
Σ1 → Σ2 is an interpretation which restricts to the identity on Σ1 ∩ Σ2. For any n-
ary R ∈ Σ1 \ Σ2, let δR := ∀x1 . . . ∀xn(Rx1 . . . xn ↔ τ(R)(x1, . . . , xn)). Then for any
φ ∈ Form(Σ1 ∪Σ2), {δR : R ∈ Σ1 \Σ2}  φ↔ τ(φ). The lemma can be demonstrated by
a straightforward proof by induction on the complexity of formulae.
Now, suppose that T1 Nagel-reduces to T2, i.e., that T+2  T1 for some definitional
extension T+2 of T2. Then for any R ∈ Σ1 \ Σ2, T+2  δR where δR is some explicit
definition of R, i.e., some formula of the form (2). So let τ(R) := τR for any such R
(where τR is theΣ2-formula occurring on the right-hand-side of the biconditional in δR).
For any S ∈ Σ1 ∩ Σ2, let τ(S) = S. Now extend τ to a map from Form(Σ1) to Form(Σ2)
by demanding that it commute with the logical constants. So τ is an interpretation from
Σ1 to Σ2 (which restricts to the identity on Σ1 ∩ Σ2), and it only remains to show that it
is a translation from T1 to T2.
So for an arbitrary Σ1-formula φ, suppose T1  φ. Then T+2  φ, since T+2  T1. By
the lemma, T+2  φ↔ τ(φ), and hence T+2  τ(φ). But τ(φ) is a Σ2-formula, and T+2 is a
conservative extension of T2; so T2  τ(φ). This suffices to show that τ is a translation,
as requested.
Next, suppose that τ is a translation from T1 to T2 which restricts to the identity on
Σ1 ∩ Σ2. For every R ∈ Σ1 \ Σ2, let δR := ∀x1 . . . ∀xn(Rx1 . . . xn ↔ τ(R)(x1, . . . , xn)).
10Note that we are only permitting the definition of new relations, and not of any new objects in the
domain: in more metaphysical terms, we are considering only reductions of properties and not of
individuals. Obviously, this is rather limiting (the individuals of physics are clearly distinct from those
of biology!)—but we will keep this restriction, in the interests of simplicity.
11cf. Barrett and Halvorson (2016)
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Now let T+2 := T2 ∪ {δR : R ∈ Σ1 \ Σ2}. So clearly, T+2 is a definitional extension of T2,
and it remains only to show that T+2  T1.
So consider any φ ∈ T1. Then T2  τ(φ), since τ is a translation. So T+2  τ(φ). By the
lemma, T+2  φ↔ τ(φ); so, T+2  φ. This suffices to prove that T+2  T1, and hence that
T1 Nagel-reduces to T2.
Let the class of Σ-structures be denoted Str(Σ). Now, given an interpretation τ :
Σ1 → Σ2, the dual map of τ is a map τ∗ : Str(Σ2)→ Str(Σ1), defined as follows: for any
Σ2-structure A, |τ∗(A)| = |A| (where |M| denotes the domain of the modelM); and
for any R ∈ Σ1 and a1, . . . , an ∈ |A|, its extension Rτ∗(A) is the set of all and only those
n-tuples which satisfy τ(R). It is straightforward to show that for any Σ2-structure A
and Σ1-sentence φ, τ∗(A) |= φ iff A |= τ(φ). As a corollary, if τ is a translation from T1
to T2, then τ∗ : Mod(T2)→ Mod(T1) (i.e., if A is a model of T2, then A is a model of T1).
Putting this all together, we get the following: if T1 Nagel-reduces to T2, then the re-
duction naturally induces amap fromMod(T2) toMod(T1). Moreover, if the translations
between a collection of theories constitute a posetal category, then their dual maps will
as well: this follows from the fact that given translations τ1 : T1 → T2 and τ2 : T2 → T3,
(τ2 ◦ τ1)∗ = τ∗1 ◦ τ∗2 . So such a collection of translations gives rise to a system of de-
scriptive levels of the kind motivated in the previous section. Thus, Nagel-reduction
entails supervenience. Moreover, it entails List-reduction: given any L1-sentence φ1
and a translation τ : T1 → T2, φ1 List-reduces to τ(φ2). It follows that the example in
Theorem 1 also shows that supervenience does not entail Nagel-reducibility.
Incidentally, the dual maps will not typically be surjective (as maps between classes
of models)—nor would it be appropriate to require that they were. To see this, observe
that the following principle seems plausible: if T1 reduces to T2, and if T0 is a subtheory
of T1 (i.e. if every sentence of T0 is a sentence of T1) then T0 reduces to T2. But it
is an immediate consequence of this that not all dual maps can be surjective. Let T0
be a proper subtheory of T1, let τ be the translation from T1 to T2, and observe that
it is thereby a translation from T0 to T2. If τ∗ is surjective as a map from Mod(T2) to
Mod(T1), then we are done. If not, then since T0 is a proper subtheory of T1, there is at
least one modelM of T0 which is not a model of T1. Since the image of Mod(T2) under
τ∗ is Mod(T1), thenM is not in said image of, and so τ∗ is not surjective as a map from
Mod(T2) to Mod(T0).12 As discussed previously, however, we can impose surjectivity of
supervenience maps as maps on possible worlds by fiat.
12This poses a problem for Suppes’ account of reduction (Suppes, 1957, 1967), given that he effectively
presupposes surjectivity of the map from the lower-level theory to the higher-level theory associated
with reduction.
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With all this in hand, we now return to ourmain task: what kinds of constraints could
be imposed on supervenience maps, in order to guarantee that they are associated with
some form of reducibility? First, I will consider the idea that the supervenience maps
must preserve similarity, as encoded in topological data about the models.
3 Supervenience and continuity
In his (2011b), Butterfield asks us to consider the sequence of functions gn : R→ R, for
n ∈ N+ := N \ {0}, where
gn(x) :=

−1 if x < − 1n
nx if − 1n ≤ x ≤ 1n
1 if 1n < x
(4)




−1 if x < 0
0 if x = 0
1 if 0 < x
(5)
As Butterfield notes, for each finite n the function gn is continuous; yet the limit of the
sequence of these individually continuous functions, g∞, is discontinuous (at 0). Now
consider the function f• : N+ ∪ {∞} → {0, 1}, defined by
fn :=
0 if n ∈ N+1 if n =∞ (6)
We can now define a two-level ontological system, in the sense of List, by taking one
ontology to be the set {gn}n∈N+∪{g∞}, the other to be the set {fn}n∈N+∪{∞} = {0, 1}, and
the supervenience map to be σ : gn 7→ fn. Alternatively, we could take the lower-level
ontology to consist of all functions R → R, the higher-level ontology to consist (again)
of the set {0, 1}, and the supervenience function to be a function mapping continuous
functions to 0 and discontinuous functions to 1.
This supervenience map fails to preserve limits. The limit of the sequence of lower-
level worlds g1, g2, . . . is g∞, and σ(g∞) = 1. By contrast, the limit of the sequence
σ(g1), σ(g2), . . . is the limit of the sequence 0, 0, . . . , which is of course 0. So it makes a
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differencewhetherwe take the limit before or after applying the superveniencemap; tak-
ing the limit does not commute with supervenience. Thinking of topological structure
as giving a standard of similarity among the models,13 let us say that a supervenience
map which fails to commute with limits in this fashion is not similarity-preserving.
But now consider again the counterexample constructed in the proof of Theorem 1.
We canmake this example resembles Butterfield’s example of the functions, by defining
the modelsMn, for n ∈ N, as follows: Mn assigns > to P0 through Pn, and ⊥ to all
remaining sentence-letters. Then there is an intuitive sense in which the models in the
sequence M0,M1,M2, . . . get “more and more similar” to the model M—that is, a
sense in which we can regardM as the limit of the sequenceMn as n goes to infinity.
This intuition receives a precise expression in the concept of the Stone topology of a class
of propositional models: in that topology, a sequence of models Mn converges to a
modelM if and only if the sequence of truth-values PMn converges to the truth-value
PM, for every sentence-letter P .14 However, the supervenience map does not play nice
with this convergence structure: just as with Butterfield’s example, the supervenient
image of the limit of the sequence (i.e.,MF ) is not the limit of the supervenient images
of the sequence (i.e.,M¬F ). In other words, the supervenience map is not similarity-
preserving.
This suggests a conjecture: perhaps all such failures of reduction are associated with
the failure of the supervenience map to be similarity-preserving? In the propositional
case, this turns out to be correct. More specifically, we have the following result.
Theorem 3. Suppose that T1 and T2 are propositional theories. Then there is a translation
τ : T1 → T2 iff there is a map σ : Mod(T2) → Mod(T1) which is continuous in the Stone
topology. In the event that this holds, σ = τ∗.
Proof. First, suppose that τ is a translation from T1 to T2. Let T1 and T2 be the
Lindenbaum-Tarski algebras of T1 and T2.15 By Stone’s representation theorem, any
homomorphism ρ : T1 → T2 is associated with a (Stone-)continuous function σ :
Mod(T2) → Mod(T1) and vice versa. So in one direction, the translation τ : T1 → T2
gives rise to a homomorphism ρ : T1 → T2, and thence to a continuous function σ,
which coincides with the dual map τ∗. And in the other, a continuous function σ gives
rise to a homomorphism ρ; but any homomorphism between atomic Boolean algebras
13cf. Fletcher (2016)
14Halvorson (2012)
15The Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra of a propositional theory T is a Boolean algebra whose elements are
T -equivalent sets of sentences, and whose meet, join and complement are given by (the abstractions of)
the conjunction, disjunction and negation operators.
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is generated by a map from the atoms of one to those of the other, and so ρ is generated
by a translation τ : T1 → T2, which is such that τ∗ = σ.
4 The first-order case
Let us now turn our attention to the case of first-order theories. It will be helpful to split
our enquiry into two parts. First, can we find conditions on a supervenience mapping
sufficient for that mapping to be associated with a reduction? Second, can we think of
those conditions as imposing a requirement of similarity-preservation?
With regard to the first question, the following result—based on a result by van
Benthem and Pearce (1984)—provides an affirmative answer.
Theorem 4. Suppose that T1 and T2 are first-order theories. Then there is a translation
τ : T1 → T2 iff there is a map σ : Mod(T2) → Mod(T1) which preserves isomorphisms,
ultraproducts and domains.16 In the event that this holds, σ = τ∗.
Before turning to the proof, I review the relevant notion of an ultraproduct.17 First,
an ultrafilter over a set X is a non-empty set U of subsets of X , such that
• ∅ 6∈ U
• U is closed under intersection: if A ∈ U and B ∈ U , then A ∩B ∈ U
• U is closed under supersets: if A ∈ U and A ⊆ B (for B ⊆ X), then B ∈ U
• For every subset A of X , exactly one of A and X \A is in U .
Roughly speaking, one can think of an ultrafilter as equipping X with a notion of
“almost all”-ness: relative to U , a subsetA ⊆ X contains “almost all” elements ofX just
in case A ∈ U .
Given an ultrafilter U on some set I (which we will call the set of indices), and an
indexed family {Mi : i ∈ I} of Σ-structures, the ultraproduct ΠUMi of the family is
a Σ-structure defined as follows. First, form the Cartesian product Πi∈I |Mi| of the
domains of the structures in the family: that is, each element of Πi∈I |Mi| is an indexed
family of elements a = {ai ∈ |Mi| : i ∈ I}, one from eachMi. Then define the following
equivalence relation: a ∼ b iff the set of indices i such that ai = bi is in the ultrafilter.
That is, a and b are equivalent if they are identical at “almost all”models in the family of
16Asdiscussed above (see footnote 10), the condition of domain-preservation is clearly not very appropriate
to the context of scientific theories—but is helpful in simplifying the technicalities.
17For an introduction to ultraproducts, see (Hodges, 1997, §8.5).
11
structures. We then take the domain of the ultraproduct to be the quotient of Πi∈I |Mi|
by this equivalence relation (so its elements are sets of “almost-everywhere-identical”
indexed families). Finally, we determine the extension of any Σ-symbol R as follows:
for n-ary R, the tuple 〈a1, . . . ,an〉 is in the extension of R if and only if the set of indices
i such that 〈ai1, . . . , ain〉 ∈ RMi is in U . Thus, for instance, an indexed family a satisfies
a unary predicate iff it satisfies the predicate at “almost all” models in the family of
structures. An ultraproduct all of whose factors are identical is called an ultrapower: an
ultrapower ofM, relative to the ultrafilter U , will be denoted ΠUM.
The key result for ultraproducts is Łoś’s theorem:18 given an ultraproduct ΠUMi and
an n-ary Σ-formula φ, φ is satisfied by the n-tuple 〈a1, . . . ,an〉 in ΠUMi if and only if
the set of indices i such that φ is satisfied by 〈ai1, . . . , ain〉 inMi, is in U . Thus, roughly
speaking, an ultraproduct satisfies a formula if and only if “almost all” the models in
the indexed family satisfy that formula. As a corollary, given some ultrapower ΠUM, φ
is satisfied by the n-tuple 〈a1, . . . , an〉 (where every ap ∈ |M|) if and only if φ is satisfied
by 〈a1, . . . ,an〉 in ΠUM, where for every i ∈ I and 1 ≤ p ≤ n, aip = ap.
With this in hand, we can turn to the proof itself.19
Proof. The left-to-right direction of the proof is reasonably straightforward: it is just a
matter of verifying that for any translation τ : T1 → T2, τ∗ preserves isomorphisms,
ultraproducts and domains.
Now consider the right-to-left direction. For any model M of T2, let M+ be the
definitional expansion of M to Σ1 ∪ Σ2 defined by σ: that is, the model such that
(i) |M+| = |M|; (ii) for any R ∈ Σ1 and any a1, . . . , an ∈ |M|, a1, . . . , an ∈ RM+ iff
a1, . . . , an ∈ Rσ(M) (exploiting the fact that σ preserves domains); and (iii) for any
S ∈ Σ2 and any b1, . . . , bm ∈ |M|, b1, . . . , bm ∈ SM+ iff b1, . . . , bm ∈ SM. Now define
K := {M+ :M∈ Mod(T2)} (7)
First, we want to show that K is axiomatisable. A necessary and sufficient condition
for this is that K is closed under isomorphism and taking ultraproducts, and has the
property that for any structure A, if some ultrapower of A lies inK then A itself lies in
K.20 The first two properties follow immediately from σ’s preservation of isomorphism
and ultraproducts, so it remains only to prove the third.
18See, for example, (Hodges, 1997, Theorem 8.5.3).
19The proof below is a simplified version of the proof (of a more general result) given by van Benthem and
Pearce (1984).
20(Hodges, 1997, Corollary 8.5.13)
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To this end, suppose that ΠUA ∈ K. Let us denote the reduct of A to Σ2 byM;21
we want to show that A =M+. Taking reducts commutes with taking ultraproducts,22
so the reduct of ΠUA is ΠUM. Since ΠUA ∈ K, ΠUM ∈ Mod(T2). By Łoś’s theorem,
M ∈ Mod(T2). So A is an expansion of a T2-model. It remains to show that for any
R ∈ Σ1 and any a1, . . . , an ∈ |A|, 〈a1, . . . , an〉 ∈ RA iff 〈a1, . . . , an〉 ∈ Rσ(M). This goes
as follows:
〈a1, . . . , an〉 ∈ RA iff 〈a1, . . . ,an〉 ∈ RΠUA (Łoś’s theorem)
iff 〈a1, . . . ,an〉 ∈ Rσ(ΠUM) (since ΠUA ∈ K)
iff 〈a1, . . . ,an〉 ∈ RΠUσ(M) (σ preserves ultraproducts)
iff 〈a1, . . . , an〉 ∈ Rσ(M) (Łoś’s theorem again)
Thus, there is some theory T+ such that K = mod(T+). But now observe that for
any two models A,B of T+ (i.e. any A,B ∈ K), if the reducts of A and B to Σ2 are
identical, then A = B. Thus, T+ implicitly defines every R ∈ Σ1 in terms of Σ2. But then
by Beth’s theorem, T+ explicitly defines R, and so entails some sentence of the form
∀x1 . . . ∀xn(Rx1 . . . xn ↔ τR(x1, . . . , xn)). So, we define an interpretation τ : Σ1 → Σ2 by
setting τ(R) = τR for every R ∈ Σ1, and extending by requiring τ to commute with the
logical constants. It is straightforward to confirm that σ = τ∗, and that τ is a translation
from T1 to T2.
Now consider the second question raised at the start of this section: whether the
conditions on Theorem 4 can be thought of as imposing a requirement of similarity-
preservation. One way to show this would be to argue that an ultraproduct can be
regarded as a kind of “limit” of a family of models. In support of this, we could observe
that in the context of propositional logic (which, recall, is simply first-order logic where
all predicates are nullary) the ultraproduct of a sequence of models is the limit of that
sequence in the Stone topology.23 More generally, Łoś’s theorem provides a sense in
which an indexed family of models “converges” on the ultraproduct. However, the
sense of convergence here must remain rather loose. The standard axioms governing
convergence require that if all members of a converging family are identical to some
object, then the limit of the family is that object;24 yet, in general, the ultrapower of a
givenmodel is not identical to thatmodel, nor is it even isomorphic to it.25 Nevertheless,
21That is, M is the Σ2-model such that |M| = |A|, and for any R ∈ Σ2 and any b1, . . . , bm ∈ |M|,
b1, . . . , bm ∈ SM iff b1, . . . , bm ∈ SA.
22(Hodges, 1997, Theorem 8.5.1)
23Halvorson and Tsementzis (2017)
24See e.g. Dudley (1964), Patten (2014).
25Although it is, by Łoś’s theorem, elementarily equivalent to it. We could try working with elementary-
equivalence classes of models instead, and see if the ultraproduct does provide an appropriate notion
of convergence in that setting. However, then there will be the problem of how to justify demanding
13
I conclude that the above considerations do illuminate some aspects of the relationship
between reduction (thought of as an essentially syntactic relation between theories)
and supervenience (thought of as an essentially semantic relation between models of
theories, or the possible worlds they represent): we have learned that constraints on a
supervenience map, statable in purely semantic terms, can enforce reducibility.
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